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Abstract 
This article looks at the preconditions that an emerging economy needs to fulfill, before it can 
adopt inflation targeting as a monetary policy regime. The study is conducted using the 
Indian economy as a case study. We conduct an in-depth sector-wise analysis of the Indian 
economy to evaluate the independence of India’s monetary policy from fiscal, external, 
structural and financial perspectives. Dominance from any of these sectors may divert 
monetary policy from the objective of maintaining price stability in the economy. Our 
analysis suggests that among the four dominance issues, the issue of ‘structural dominance’ is 
the most acute for India. Supply shocks, hitting the economy due to structural bottlenecks, 
pose a major threat to the independent conduct of monetary policy. This study concludes that 
inflation band targeting with a wide target range would be a feasible monetary policy option 
for India.   
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PRE-CONDITIONS FOR INFLATION TARGETING IN AN 




It is generally agreed among economists and central bankers that low inflation helps to 
promote economic efficiency and growth in the long run and that price stability should be the 
long run objective of monetary policy. However, for monetary policy to successfully achieve 
its target of price stability there is a need for a ‘nominal anchor’. A nominal anchor is a 
constraint on the value of domestic money to tie down the price level to a specific value at a 
given time. It helps to promote price stability by fixing expectations directly through its 
constraint on the value of domestic money. Conducting monetary policy without an explicit 
nominal anchor is possible but risky. The most important risk is lack of transparency of 
approach that creates volatility in financial markets and causes uncertainty among producers 
and the general public about the future course of inflation and output. Monetary policy can be 
conducted better if there is a well-defined nominal anchor. Many central banks use an 
‘inflation-target’ as an effective and successful nominal anchor for monetary policy. The 
inflation targeting strategy has the following key elements: 
•  Public announcement of a medium-term numerical target for inflation 
•  An institutional commitment to price stability as the primary long-run goal of 
monetary policy 
•  An information inclusive strategy 
•  Increased transparency of the monetary policy strategy through communication with 
the public and the markets about the plans and objectives of monetary policy 
•  Increased accountability of the central bank for attaining its inflation objective 
Inflation targeting, as a monetary policy operating strategy, has some distinct advantages for 
the economy. It allows monetary policy to focus on domestic concerns. Velocity shocks 
become irrelevant in inflation targeting as monetary policy no longer relies on a stable 
money-inflation relationship. An inflation target allows the monetary authorities to use all the 
available information to decide the best course for monetary policy. Inflation targeting also 
has the advantage that it is easily understood by the public. An explicit numerical inflation 
target increases the accountability of the central bank. It helps the central bank to reduce 
political pressure to pursue inflationary monetary policy thereby avoiding falling into a time 
inconsistency trap. Another important advantage of inflation targeting regime is that it also 3 
 
takes into account the fluctuations in other goal variables like output and employment and it 
is possible to accommodate short-run stabilization goals in an inflation targeting framework. 
Inflation targeting was adopted by a number of industrialized economies in the 1990s, 
starting with New Zealand in 1990, Canada in February 1991, Israel in December 1991, the 
United Kingdom in 1992, Sweden and Finland in 1993 and Australia and Spain in 1994. The 
performance of inflation targeting based monetary policy has been quite good so far. Many of 
the empirical studies show that an inflation targeting regime was successful in reducing 
inflation significantly. Bernanke et al. (1999), for example, found that inflation remained 
lower after inflation targeting than would have been forecast using Vector Auto-Regressions 
(VARs) estimated with the data from the period before inflation targeting started. It also 
helped to maintain price stability once it is achieved. It has prevented one off shocks to 
inflation permanently affecting the inflation rate. As Mishkin (2001) observed;  
“after Canada adopted inflation targets in February 1991, the regime was challenged by a 
new goods and service tax (GST), an adverse supply shock that in earlier periods might have 
led to a ratcheting up in inflation. Instead the tax increase led to only a one time increase in 
the price level; it did not generate second and third round rises in wages and prices that would 
lead to a persistent rise in the inflation rate. Another successful example of inflation targeting 
policy is the experience of the United Kingdom and Sweden following their departures from 
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) rate pegs in 1992. In both cases, devaluation 
would normally have stimulated inflation because of the direct effects on higher export and 
import prices and the subsequent effects on wage demands and price setting behavior. It 
seems reasonable to attribute the lack of inflationary response in these episodes to adoption of 
inflation targeting, which short-circuited the second and later round effects and helped to 
focus public attention on the temporary nature of the devaluation shocks. Indeed, one reason 
why inflation targets were adopted in both the countries was to achieve exactly this result.” 
Mishkin (2001 p. 20) 
The adoption of an inflation target resulted in below normal output during disinflationary 
phases, but once the low level of inflation was achieved, output and employment returned to 
their previous high levels and output fluctuations lessened.  
However, inflation targeting did not establish immediate credibility for monetary policy. It 
came slowly with the changes in the corresponding institutional arrangements for wage and 4 
 
price setting. As Bernanke et al. (1999, p. 275) said, “It appears that, for monetary policy 
makers, announcements alone are not enough; the only way to gain credibility is to earn it.” 
Further stressed by Mishkin (2001, p. 23), “It appears, unfortunately, that there is no free 
(credibility) lunch from inflation targeting. The only way to achieve disinflation is the hard 
way: by inducing short-run losses in output and employment in order to achieve the longer 
economic benefits of price stability.” 
Many Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) also adopted an inflation-targeting approach to 
monetary policy, including Chile in 1991, Brazil in 1999, Czech Republic in 1997, Poland in 
1998 and Hungary in 2001. Inflation targeting provided a strong nominal anchor that can 
keep inflation in check in emerging market economies, despite the fact that they often face a 
more challenging political and economic environment than developed countries.  However, in 
these economies the frequency of target misses is likely to be higher than their developed 
counterparts. Thus inflation targeting central bankers in EMEs focus on the medium term 
horizon to ensure that disinflation remains on track and that inflation converges to a level 
deemed consistent with price stability. It also requires good transparency and good 
communication by the central bank to the public, explaining, why inflation targets were 
missed. 
This study contributes to the growing literature of inflation-targeting in EMEs, with particular 
focus on the Indian economy. The increased integration of Indian economy with world 
economy has lead to transmission of uncertainties related to world financial and -oil markets, 
into the domestic (Indian) economy, hence making inflation more unpredictable. This 
changed scenario calls for a change to a monetary policy framework which is transparent and 
forward-looking. Inflation targeting by its very nature, encompasses all these properties. 
There are a few descriptive studies available on the suitability of inflation targeting regime 
for India and the practical issues related to it, however, the applicability and feasibility 
aspects of inflation targeting for India has rather been ignored in the exiting literature. This 
gap in the literature on Indian monetary policy motivated the current study.  
The problems related to fiscal, financial and, monetary institutions are more severe in EMEs 
and this makes the application of inflation targeting more difficult in these economies. Thus 
the issue of economic and institutional preconditions necessary for the successful adoption of 
an inflation target becomes extremely relevant. This paper presents an in-depth analysis of 
the necessary preconditions for inflation targeting in India.  5 
 
The organization of rest of this article is as follows: the next section presents the meaning and 
definition of preconditions for inflation targeting; the third section gives a brief overview of 
the changes occurring in Indian economy along the lines of inflation targeting regime; section 
four describes the data and outlines the methodology of this study. A discussion of results is 
presented in the fifth section and final section presents the conclusions and directions for 
future research.  
 
2. Preconditions for Inflation Targeting 
There are five fundamental institutional weaknesses in emerging market countries that must 
be taken into account to derive sound theory and policy advice as pointed by Mishkin (2004). 
These are: 
•  Weak fiscal institutions 
•  Weak financial institutions including government prudential regulation and 
supervision 
•  Low credibility of monetary institutions 
•  Currency substitution and liability dollarization 
•  Vulnerability to sudden stops (of capital inflows) 
These institutional weaknesses make the application of inflation targeting more difficult in 
EMEs. This requires the careful analysis of the existing state of affairs in these economies 
before putting inflation target into practice so that depending upon the institutional 
characteristics present in the economy, the policy can be suitably amended. Thus the issue of 
‘institutional and economic preconditions’ necessary for the successful adoption of inflation 
target becomes extremely relevant.  
The preconditions relate to potential features of emerging economies as weak fiscal regimes, 
the risks associated with poorly regulated financial system and large external shocks, each of 
which can hinder the use of inflation targeting. Each of these problems may lead to a form of 
dominance namely fiscal, financial and external.  
 
Further, due to peculiar nature of the Indian economy in the form of many structural 
bottlenecks (namely constraints occurring due to underdeveloped infrastructure such as poor 6 
 
irrigation facilities, poor transport facilities among others, there may be one other form of 
dominance namely structural dominance. A sector wise analysis of Indian economy can shed 
more light on these issues. This would in turn help in determining which form of dominance 
is more acute for India and how the inflation targeting framework may be amended to cope 
with it. 
2.1 Fiscal Dominance  
Fiscal stability and a strong fiscal regime is the primary necessary condition for inflation 
targeting. Fiscal dominance is defined as a situation when irresponsible fiscal policy (or a 
large fiscal deficit of the government) puts pressure on the monetary authorities to monetize 
debt, thereby producing rapid money growth and high inflation. However, monetary policy is 
the part of the overall economic policy and so it cannot be separated from other policies like 
fiscal policy and policy objectives. Inflation targeting does not require the central bank to be 
fully independent but it should be able to use instruments of monetary policy freely to attain 
its inflation objectives. 
2.2 External Dominance 
The macroeconomic environment is more volatile in emerging market economies and they 
are more susceptible to external shocks than developed economies. Therefore, external 
shocks play an important role and may result in huge volatility of exchange rate, inflation rate 
and interest rate in developing economies. External dominance is defined as the presence of 
large external shocks that generates instability in the economy and may jeopardize the 
fulfilment of the inflation target. This study econometrically analyses the importance of 
external shocks for the Indian economy to see whether the Indian economy exhibits the 
symptom of external dominance. 
2.3 Structural Dominance 
The Indian economy is still a developing economy with structural weaknesses and physical 
bottlenecks and this made the economy vulnerable to various shocks in the form of adverse 
supply shocks. We try to quantify the importance of these shocks by studying the impact of these 
shocks on the money supply and hence inflation in the economy. Our basic purpose is to see how far 
the Reserve Bank of India
3 (RBI) is independent of these shocks or whether it is required to 
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accommodate these shocks and make changes in money supply leading to a form of  ‘structural 
dominance’. 
2.4 Financial Dominance 
A sound and stable financial system is a necessary prerequisite for an independent and 
efficient implementation of monetary policy and thus for an inflation targeting regime. The 
financial sector poses problems in the independent conduct of monetary policy when it is 
fragile and prone to financial crisis or segmented thus hindering the interest rate as monetary 
policy instrument.  
Given the higher severity of these problems for the EMEs, they need to be addressed prior to, 
adoption of inflation targeting as a monetary policy regime. A noteworthy point in this 
discussion, as argued by Mishkin (2004),  
“However, although fiscal and financial stability are necessary conditions for inflation 
control, I think the view that these reforms are prerequisites for attempting an inflation 
targeting regime in emerging market countries is too strong… … …  If an inflation targeting 
regime is to be sustainable, a commitment to and work on these reforms is required when 
inflation targeting is implemented.”   
3. The Indian Scenario 
The Indian policy makers initiated major economic reforms in the early 1990s which were 
accompanied by major changes in the fiscal policy, monetary policy and the fiscal-monetary 
relationship. On the fiscal front, the fiscal-monetary relationship has undergone a momentous 
change with the ‘September 1994 agreement’ between the central government and the RBI to 
phase out the use of ad hoc Treasury Bills over a period of three years. The practice of 
issuing ad hoc Treasury bills meant that there was no check on the expansion of RBI credit to 
the Central Government.  For over three decades, the system of ad hoc treasury bills has been 
the cause of automatic monetization of the Government’s budget deficit. This system of 
issuance of ad hoc Treasury Bills was replaced with the system of ‘Ways and Mean 
Advances (WMA)’ with effect from April 1997. The quantum available to the government as 
WMA to meet the temporary mismatch between receipts and expenditure is now eventually 
agreed upon between the RBI and the government with semiannual ceilings. Delinking of the 
budget deficit from its monetization by the RBI admittedly provided the central bank greater 8 
 
functional independence. An increasing portion of the fiscal deficit of the government is 
being financed by the borrowing at market related rates of interest. 
There has been a reduction in pre-emption of commercial bank’s resources from well over a 
half to about third of their resources. Thus the mandatory component of market financing of 
government borrowing has decreased. A policy decision has been taken by the RBI to 
eliminate its long term lending operations to the commercial sector and to moderate other 
forms of monetization by reducing direct funding of development activity. Most public 
enterprises have been moved out of what is described as the ‘approved borrowing 
programme’ and are encouraged to borrow from the market through voluntary subscriptions. 
Several initiatives and measures have been taken in recent years on the fiscal front to contain 
the fiscal deficit and also revenue deficit.  
The major step in this direction was taken in December 2000 when the ‘Fiscal Responsibility 
and Budget Management Bill’ was passed by the Indian parliament. This bill provided for a 
legal and institutional framework to eliminate the revenue deficit, bring down the fiscal 
deficit, contain the growth of  public debt and stabilize deficit as a proportion of GDP within 
a timeframe. The proposed law puts the onus on the government itself to strengthen the 
institutional framework for the conduct of prudent and accountable fiscal policies and paves 
the way for macroeconomic stability. Table 1 lists several fiscal dominance measures; 
namely, seignorage revenue, fiscal deficit, RBI credit to government (as % of GDP) and the 
inflation tax rate. All the fiscal dominance measures decline for the period 1994-95 to 2003-
04 except for fiscal deficit (as a ratio of GDP) which was lowest for the period 1970-71 to 
1985-86. However, it shows a fall from the period 1985-2004 to 1994-2004. These 
preliminary fiscal dominance measures provide evidence in favor of the declining effect of 








The Indian government launched a comprehensive program of structural reforms for the 
external sector in the early 1990s. These reforms included the following major changes in the 
external sector: 
•  Introduction of a market-determined exchange rate; 
•  Liberalization of current account transactions leading to current account 
convertibility; 
•  Compositional shift in capital flows away from debt to non-debt creating flows;  
•  Strict regulation of external commercial borrowings especially for short-term debts 
•  Discouraging volatile elements of flows from Non Resident Indians(NRIs) 
•  A new benchmark for reserve –adequacy 
•  Full freedom for outflows associated with inflows (i.e., principal, interest, dividend, 
profit and sale proceeds) 
The policy framework for the external sector was implemented along with policy changes in 
trade, industrial and financial sectors. As a part of the external sector reforms capital flows 
were managed keeping in view the needs of efficiency and stability.  There was also a smooth 
movement from an administered exchange rate system to a market-determined exchange rate. 
India adopted current account convertibility in 1994. It was also recognized that there could 
be capital outflows from residents in the guise of current account transactions. Hence certain 
safeguards were built into the regulation relating to current account transactions. On 
dollarization, it is recognized that large-scale dollar denominated assets within a country can 
disrupt the economy by creating potential for destabilizing flows. No dollar denominated 
transactions are allowed between residents. Exchange earners’ foreign currency accounts can 
be used only for external payments and if such balances have to be used for local payments, 
they have to be converted into rupee. The counterpart of dollarization is the 
internationalization of domestic currency i.e. there are instances when a currency of a 
developing country could be officially traded outside the country without any underlying 
trade or investment transactions. India does not permit the rupee to be transacted offshore. In 
brief, a highly conservative approach is adopted with reference to dollarization and 
internationalization of the domestic currency. Foreign currency reserves have been steadily 10 
 
built up by encouraging non-debt creating flows and de-emphasizing debt creating flows. 
Foreign exchange reserves are kept at the level, which is adequate to withstand both cyclical 
and unanticipated shocks.  
Table 2 presents the changes in the Indian economy since the 1990s on the external front. 
Both imports as well as exports exhibit a rising trend. The main point of concern is 
continuously increasing dependence on oil imports which may increase the vulnerability of 
the economy to external crisis but at same time some favorable developments are also taking 
place in the form of a continuously declining trend in short term debt (as a percentage of 
GDP) and an increasing trend in non-debt creating capital inflows in the form of foreign 
investment. Further, foreign reserves also show a continuously rising trend. These 
developments limit the susceptibility of the economy to shocks originating outside the 
country.  
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 here 
------------------------------------------------ 
Financial Sector reforms also started with the adoption of the structural adjustment cum 
stabilization programme by the Indian government in 1991. In November 1991, the 
Narsimham Committee was set up to study the working of the financial system. The main 
recommendations of the committee were to reinstate the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) as an 
instrument of monetary policy and not as a means of controlling the secondary expansion of 
credit brought about by monetization of the fiscal deficit, bring down the Statutory Liquidity 
Ratio (SLR) to 25% in a phased manner over 5 years and phase out the directed credit 
program to the priority sector by the Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs). The committee 
also recommended the deregulation of interest rates and dismantling the policy of 
concessional interest rates on Government borrowing which were to be in line with the 
market determined rate of interest. The committee proposed to liberalize policies towards 
foreign banks with regard to opening of offices and branches or subsidiaries. 
The reforms in the financial sector were carried out along the above described lines. These 
changes in the financial sector helped in reducing the reducing fiscal dominance over the 
financial sector, thus, making way for more independent monetary policy. Progress in the use 
of market-based instruments was achieved with the introduction of the Liquidity Adjustment 11 
 
Facility (LAF) in June 2000. The LAF operations combined with strategic open market 
operations, consistent with market liquidity conditions, have evolved as the principal 
operating procedure of monetary policy of the RBI.  
A feature unique to the Indian financial system and having bearing upon the independence of 
the central bank, relates to government ownership of most of the commercial banks in India. 
With the onset of reforms, there has been a change in the ownership pattern of banks. The 
legislative framework governing Public Sector Banks (PSBs) was amended in 1994 to enable 
them to raise capital funds from the market by way of public issue of shares. The government 
has initiated legislative process to reduce the minimum Government ownership in 
nationalized banks from 51% to 33%, without altering their public sector character. Steps 
have also been initiated to infuse competition into the financial system. RBI issued guidelines 
in 1993 with respect of establishment of new banks in the private sector. Likewise, foreign 
banks have been given more liberal entry and the norms for entry of new private banks were 
established. Another major element of financial sector reforms in India has been a set of 
prudential measures aimed at strengthening the banking system as well as ensuring safety and 
soundness through greater transparency, accountability and public credibility. Capital 
adequacy norms for banks are in line with the Basel committee standards and from the end of 
March 2000, the prescribed ratio has been raised to 9%. The Board for Financial Supervision 
(BFS) was constituted as a part of the reforms. The supervisory strategy of BFS consists of a 
four-pronged approach, including restructuring system of inspection, setting up of off-site 
surveillance, enhancing the role of external auditors and strengthening corporate governance, 
internal controls and audit procedures. The BFS, in effect, integrates within the Reserve Bank 
the supervision of banks, NBFCs and financial institutions. 
These reforms had a significant impact on India’s financial sector in terms of soundness, 
stability and ability to absorb risks. Tables 3 and 4 present some leading financial soundness 
indicators for the Indian economy
4 and the trends in them in the recent period (mainly the 
period since and 2000 onwards when financial sector reforms started showing their impact). 
Table 3 presents the capital adequacy indicators for SCBs. Two basic indicators; namely, the 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) and Capital to Risk Weighted Asset Ratio (CRAR) suggest 
significant improvement in the health of the banking sector in India. The capital adequacy 
ratio for nationalized banks and state bank group banks has increased from 10.29% in 1996-
                                                            
4 Our choice of sample range is governed by the availability of data. 12 
 
97 to 13.15% in 2003-04 and more importantly the ratio shows a significant improvement for 
the period after 2000. Also table 3 suggests that there have been a significant increase in the 
number of banks having CRAR above 10%, in the period after 2002. Table 4 lists other 
financial soundness indicators of interest. These are mainly asset quality indicators (columns 
I, II, III, and IV), earning and profitability indicators (columns V, VI, VII) and liquidity 
indicators (columns VIII and IX).  
------------------------------------------------ 




Overall as we see that all the financial soundness indicators show increasing robustness of the 
banking sector for the period 2000 to 2004. The only worrying fact is the liquid assets as a 
percentage of total assets of SCBs (IX column of Table 4) which showed some deterioration 
for the period 2000 to 2004. 
 
The above discussion reflects that desired changes are taking place in Indian economy from 
inflation targeting point of view. Since our preliminary dominance measures are only 
suggestive, we did more elaborative econometric testing to examine all the above- mentioned 
dominance issues for India. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
We formulated sector specific VAR models to examine all the four dominance issues for 
India. To analyze the fiscal dominance issue, we formulated a three variable VAR model 
consisting Wholesale Price Index (WPI) inflation, gross fiscal deficit as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) at current market prices and reserve money growth; for external 
dominance issue, we formulated a four variable VAR model consisting call money rate (as a 
measure of short term interest rate), nominal effective exchange rate, WPI inflation and Index 
of industrial production (IIP). Considering the typical nature of the Indian economy where 13 
 
exchange rate may not accurately measure the effect of external shocks
5 and the economy is 
more prone to oil price shocks (more in recent years as dependence on oil and world oil 
prices are rising.), the external shocks are measured by exchange rate shocks as well as oil 
price shocks also. Therefore, to examine external dominance, we also considered alternative 
VAR framework consisting Oil price inflation instead of nominal effective exchange rate. For 
oil price inflation, we have taken crude oil price index series published by International 
Monetary Fund, which is a simple average of ‘Dated Brent’, ‘West Texas Intermediate’, and 
‘Dubai Fateh’ oil prices. For structural dominance, we formulated a VAR model consisting of 
reserve money growth, WPI inflation and supply shocks;
6 for financial sector dominance, we 
formulated VAR model consisting of call money rate, reserve money growth and BSE-sensex 
(stock market is taken as a representative of financial sector in India). 
All the variables are sourced from RBI database other than the series for international crude 
prices. All the series other than interest rate and supply shocks are transformed as annual 
changes in log values. Thus all the variables denote year-on year changes in the original 
series and this takes care of seasonality issues in the monthly sample. All the variables are on 
1993-94 base period. All the variables entering into the estimation are stationary. 
The period of analysis for different dominance issues differ depending on availability of the 
data and also on the concerns of time-frame of impact of reforms on the sector as suggested 
by the literature. 
4. 1 Methodology 
The main methodology employed to examine all the four issues is that we computed 
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (GFVD) from the sector specific VAR 
models. Besides quantifying the importance of different shocks for the economy, this also 
helps to bring out variables which are important for explaining inflation volatility in India.  
                                                            
5 Since, exchange rate in India is not yet market determined and can be best described as ‘managed float’.  
6 Supply shocks have been taken from the paper ‘Identifying Long Run supply Curve in India’ by Goyal and 
Pujari, (2005). In this paper, authors estimated two-equation structural vector-auto regression model consisting 
of WPI inflation and Index of Industrial Production.
6 The authors employed two alternative identification 
schemes one for Vertical supply Curve (VSC) model in which aggregate demand shocks have no effect on 
growth rate of output giving a vertical long run supply curve and the other is Horizontal Supply Curve (HSC) 
model in which aggregate demand shocks have no effect on inflation giving horizontal supply curve. The 
sample for this analysis is also from 1994 April to 2004 March. 
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Generalized VAR analysis, proposed by Koop et al. (1996), is based on reconsidering what 
impulse responses and variance decompositions are meant to recover. This technique changed 
the focus from the “pure” structural shocks that are identified by orthogonalizing VAR 
innovations, to an understanding of what a typical historical innovation tells regarding the 
dynamics of the model. These historical innovations are not necessarily orthogonal, but 
contrary to VAR innovations, embody the information regarding the contemporaneous 
correlation of these innovations. 
Consider the following VAR model in the moving average form 
t t L C y μ
1 ) (
− =                                          (1) 
And assume that μt is distributed multivariate normal, i.e., N (0,Ω). This implies that yt is also 
multivariate normal with zero mean and covariance matrix C (L)
-1ΩC(L)
-1’. 
Generalized impulse response analysis considers the conditional expectation of  yt given a 
specific shock to μt.instead of orthogonalizing the VAR innovations. 
The ‘average’ effect on yt of a historical shock of say  μit , the ith component of  μt,can be 
obtained by taking the expectation of equation(1) conditional on shock μit= ν, 
] , | [ ) ( ] , | [ ) , (
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and given the properties of the multivariate normal distribution: 
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Where Ωi is the ith column of Ω. Although ν could be any value, it seems appropriate to set it 
equal to its historical value: the standard error of the ith shock,σii
-1/2. This choice for the value 
of ν corresponds to a unit shock of the historical shock. 
The generalized impulse response for the ith shock will be numerically equivalent to the 
impulse response function obtained using Choleski Decomposition when the ith variable is 
put first in the ordering. And also they will be numerically equivalent when Ω is diagonal, i.e. 
when system is subject to shocks that are independent. 
The Generalized Variance Decomposition (GVD) can be derived following a procedure 
similar as discussed. Namely, using the expression for yt+s and yt+s|t from equation (1), the 
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The VAR innovations μj does not embody the historical correlations of the shocks as 
summarized by Ω, so that using directly the above equation to calculate variance 
decomposition would be misleading. GVD instead look at the average portion of mean square 
forecast error (MSFE) associated with each historical shock contained in μ, conditional on the 
value of the shock equal to its standard error. Assuming as before that μ is multivariate 
normal, 
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This expression when squared can be used to calculate the portion of the variance associated 
with each of the historical shocks suitably scaled by the MSFE (yt+s). GVDs (Generalized 
Variance Decompositions) are intended to provide the ‘share’ of the movements of a series to 
historical shocks.  
The main advantage of GFVD over standard forecast error variance decomposition is that the 
forecasts are unique and not subject to the compositional effects of traditional Choleski 
decompositions. Since, we were not certain the order in which different variables included in 
different sector specific VAR models could affect each other, we computed GFVDs which is 
ordering invariant. 
GFVDs were alone not sufficient to examine fiscal dominance hypothesis (fiscal dominance 
issue) and risk bearing capacity of Indian financial market to withstand unanticipated 
monetary policy shocks (unexpected changes in interest rate or reserve money growth rate), 
we computed some additional statistics to analyze these two issues.  
For fiscal dominance issue, we estimated the following two equation model following 
Fratianni and Spinelli (2001): 
t t t t mb L A def L A c def , 1 12 11 1 ) ( ) ( ε + Δ + + =                       (6) 
t t t t mb L A def L A c mb , 2 22 21 2 ) ( ) ( ε + Δ + + = Δ                     (7) 
Where ‘def’ is the fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP at market prices and ‘∆mb’ denotes 
the change in the monetary base and ‘L’ is the lag operator.  16 
 
This simple two-equation model allows us to examine the causal relationship between deficit 
and change in monetary base. Fiscal dominance implies that changes in monetary base react 
to changes in fiscal deficit by a strict Granger causality relationship. Existence of two-way 
causality is not an indication of fiscal dominance, because change in fiscal deficit and growth 
of monetary base may be correlated without the fiscal policy dominance also. As suggested 
by Barro (1987) when government targets real budget deficits and adjust nominal deficits to 
the evolution of the price level then price level changes become correlated with changes in 
monetary base leading to positive correlation between government deficits and growth of 
monetary base even in the absence of fiscal dominance. 
Strict granger causality (fiscal dominance hypothesis) from def to ∆mb imposes two 
restrictions: 
A12(L)=0   in equation (1) and A21≠0 in equation (7) 
The analysis in the bivariable framework is restrictive as these two variables may be affected 
by a host of other variables in the economy. Hence, we extended the analysis in the 
multivariable framework as well. In the multivariable framework few other variables (namely 
real GDP growth and inflation
7), which may affect these two variables were included. 
For multivariate analysis, following Haan and Zelhorst (1990) the following system of 
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Here mt and dt denote the reserve money growth and fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP 
respectively as before and vector X contains all the other relevant variables
8. Here, the basic 
hypothesis is that if the (change in) the fiscal deficit has a positive long run effect on money 
                                                            
7 Real GDP growth captures the cyclical behaviour of money growth. Inflation, on the other hand, is the most 
important variable which can affect or be affected by deficit and money growth.  The other variables of 
relevance are abstracted from the analysis to keep sufficient degrees of freedom 
8 For multivariable analysis it is necessary to decide what variables should be included in vector X. For this 
analysis, three and four variable systems are estimated. In the three -variable system real GDP growth (∆rgdp) 
has been included to capture the cyclical behavior of money growth and in the four-variable system WPI 
inflation (log change in wholesale price index (wpiinf)) has been included as this is the most important variable 
which can affect or be affected by deficit and money growth. The other variables of relevance are abstracted 
from the analysis to keep sufficient degrees of freedom.   
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growth, the sum of λj coefficients should be positive and significantly different from zero and 
for (change in) deficit to have only a temporary effect on money growth the coefficients of λj 
should be jointly significant. 
To find out how far the stock markets in particular and financial sector in general is affected 
by the unexpected changes or the arrival of some new unanticipated information about 
reserve money and interest rate changes, it is necessary to remove the effect of past 
information on the reserve money and interest rate series. This was done by fitting an 
appropriate time series model to the respective series and interpreting the error term from the 
model as the change in the respective series that is caused by the arrival of new or unexpected 
information. We fitted ARIMA models to call money rate, growth of reserve money and BSE 
sensex. The BSE sensex and reserve money growth are log-differenced series. The residuals 
from these models are interpreted as innovations in respective time series.
9 The models were 
identified by Akaike information criterion. The residuals from the fitted time series models 
are the changes in call money rate, reserve money growth and BSE sensex due to arrival of 
some unexpected news or shocks. Since, by definition innovations are white noise processes 
the dependent variables in the estimated equation will not have any lags and the number of 
lags included for the independent variables is selected on the basis of exclusion criterion 
depending upon the F statistics. 
5. Discussion of Results 
5. 1 Issue of Fiscal Dominance 
Table 5 presents the results of analysis in the bi-variable and multivariate framework. The 
results of bivariate analysis suggests that for the entire period strict Granger causality holds 
between the deficit ratio and growth of reserve money as changes in fiscal deficit ratio causes 
reserve money growth but not vice-versa thus confirming the hypothesis of fiscal dominance 
for the Indian economy. The same holds for the initial sub-period from 1970-71 to 1984-85. 
However for the later period one of the identifying restrictions fails to hold as for this period 
the deficit is not granger causing reserve money growth. The analysis in the multi variable 
framework shows that deficit has temporary as well as positive long run effect on reserve 
money growth in both the systems. The similar analysis has been carried out for the later 
period from 1985-86 to 2003-04 to see whether in later years the situation is changing. Since 
                                                            
9 The results of the fitted time series models are presented in appendix A.2. 18 
 
the numbers of observations are less so we included only 1 lag of all the variables in the 
estimation of three and four variable VAR. This analysis for the later period however does 
not support the fiscal policy dominance over the monetary policy as the deficit has neither 
temporary nor long run effect on reserve money growth in any of the system considered. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
The GFVDs results (Table 6) show that historical shocks to reserve money growth are not 
particularly important in explaining volatility of inflation and they explain roughly 6% of 
variance of inflation in quarterly sample at the forecasting horizon of the year.  The historical 
shocks to deficit are important in explaining volatility of inflation. They explained 
approximately 39% of variance of inflation in a quarterly sample at the forecasting horizon of 
the year. This result suggests that deficit (as a ratio of GDP) contains useful information 
about the future course of inflation development and thus are important for making inflation 
forecasts.    
These findings present evidence in support of fading fiscal dominance in the recent period. 
We also found that careful monitoring of fluctuations in deficit would be important for 
inflation forecasting at a targeting horizon of the year. 
5.2 Issue of External Dominance 
For measuring external dominance, the importance of external shocks for the Indian economy 
is quantified. This exercise is helpful in analyzing the two major questions; first, the 
vulnerability of the economy to the external factors and secondly, how far these external 
factors play a role in determining domestic inflation. The external shocks are measured by 
exchange rate shocks as well as oil price shocks also. Four variables VAR containing 
exchange rate (or oil prices), WPI inflation, call money rate and index of industrial 





Insert Table 7 here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
These results show that shocks to exchange rate explain roughly 12% of forecast error of 
inflation and 5% of forecast error of interest rate at the forecasting horizon of the year. Since, 
fluctuations in exchange rate do not measure accurately the pressure of external shocks as 
central bank actively intervenes in the foreign exchange market to curb excessive volatility in 
exchange rate. Therefore, we also measured external shocks as shocks to international crude 
oil inflation. Shocks to international crude oil inflation also explained roughly the same 
forecast error of inflation and interest rate as explained by exchange rate shocks. The oil 
prices in Indian economy are not yet fully market determined but after dismantling of 
Administered Price Mechanism (APM) the susceptibility of domestic prices to international 
crude oil prices has increased. As mentioned in RBI Annual Report, 2004(Chapter 3 Money, 
Credit and Prices, page no.41), “Domestic Petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) have, in 
general, become relatively more responsive to changes in international crude oil prices after 
dismantling of the administered price mechanism (APM) in April, 2002.” These results 
suggest that external shocks do not affect the volatility of inflation and interest rate in India as 
severely as in other emerging market economies
10. Thus, it seems that external dominance is 
not much an issue for India in the sample considered here.  But with the rising dependency of 
Indian economy on oil imports, dismantling of APM and increasing globalization, this 
situation may change in future. There is a need to continue efforts towards strengthening the 
fundamentals in the economy. 
5.3 Issue of structural Dominance 
The above results (Table 8 suggest that supply shocks under horizontal supply curve explains 
almost 20 percent of variance of reserve money growth and 38% variance of inflation after a 
year while supply shocks under vertical supply curve explains about 13%  movement of 
reserve money growth and 20% variance of domestic inflation after a year. Thus, the effect of 
supply shocks originating from horizontal supply curve identification scheme is much more 
                                                            
10 For the results on other emerging market economies, refer to table 6 in Fraga et al. (2003). 20 
 
pronounced on growth rate of reserve money and inflation than the effect from vertical 
supply curve identification scheme. Goyal and Pujari (2005) also concluded:  
“While reality probably lies somewhere in the middle of our two extreme identifying 
assumptions, the results suggest that on the whole the long-run supply curve is highly elastic 
for the Indian economy, so that the HSC needs to be kept in mind in designing 
macroeconomic policy for the economy.” Goyal and Pujari (2005). 
Our analysis also suggests that shocks coming from horizontal supply curve carry greater 
relevance, implying presence of structural dominance in Indian economy. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 8 here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
5.4 Issue of Financial Sector Dominance 
To analyze the effect of unexpected changes on the volatility of the financial sector, we have 
taken two periods into consideration: one is from 1990 April to 1999 December and the other 
is from 2000 January to 2005 March
11. Depending upon number of observations in both the 
samples, we have initially included six lags in first sub sample and four lags in the next sub 
sample and then come to the number of significant lags by following general to specific 
approach and on the basis of exclusion criterion on the basis of F-statistic.  
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 9 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
Our results (Table 9) suggest that though stock markets are no longer susceptible to 
unanticipated movements in reserve money growth but they are affected by the unexpected 
                                                            
11 The choice of subsample is guided by the findings of financial soundness indicators (as given in section 3), 
which suggest that financial sector reforms started showing its impact after 2000. 
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changes in interest rates. It also highlights the fact that in recent years, interest rate has 
become a primary instrument of monetary policy, as it was not the case before. 
In order to understand the possible interactions among reserve money growth, call money rate 
and stock prices we computed the GVDs. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 10 here 
------------------------------------------------ 
The GVD results support the previous findings. In the first sample shocks to both reserve 
money as well as interest rate are negligible in explaining variance of stock prices. The 
situation is changing for the period after 2000 and interest rate shocks are becoming 
important in explaining variance of stock index and explain almost 18% of its variance at the 
forecasting horizon of 1 and half year. The increasing responsiveness of financial sector to 
interest rate impulses suggest strengthening of interest rate channel of monetary transmission. 
This is also indicative of increasing robustness of financial sector and decreasing financial 
dominance arising from fragile financial sector hindering the use of interest rate as an 
effective instrument of monetary policy. 
 
6. Conclusion and Direction of Future Research 
In this exercise, we attempted to evaluate the independence of monetary policy in India from 
all the possible spheres which may divert it from the objective of maintaining price stability 
in the economy. This analysis also addressed the question that how far India is ready for the 
inflation targeting regime. This analysis also brought out some variables which contain useful 
information about the future course of development in inflation at a forecasting horizon of a 
year.  
We found evidence in favor of fading fiscal dominance in Indian economy. We also found 
that external dominance is not much an issue for Indian economy as of now but with growing 
linkage of Indian economy with a global economy, there is a need to keep constant vigil on 
the external sector and continued efforts on improving the fundamentals of the economy.  
The analysis of financial sector highlighted the increasing robustness of banking sector and 
increasing responsiveness financial market (as characterized by stock market) to interest rate 22 
 
signals, which is an essential pre-requisite for an inflation-targeting regime. However, we 
found that Indian economy suffers from structural dominance. 
Inflation forecasts play a central role in inflation targeting framework because it is a forward-
looking regime where central bank attempt to control inflation over a targeting horizon of one 
to two years. Since, central banks do not have perfect control over inflation and inflation 
reacts to monetary policy changes with long and variable lags and also affected by factors 
other than monetary policy, inflation forecasts provides for an ideal intermediate target. “The 
central bank’s inflation forecast is indeed an ideal intermediate target:  it is by definition the 
current variable that is most correlated with the goal, it is more controllable than the goal, and 
it can be made more observable than the goal. It can also be made very transparent, and may 
therefore facilitate the central bank’s communication with the public and the public ‘s 
understanding of monetary policy.” Svensson (1997)  This discussion suggests that the 
careful monitoring of the variables that contain useful information about the movements of 
inflation over the forecasting horizon of one to two years is very crucial for the success of 
inflation (or inflation forecast) targeting. Our sector wise analysis of Indian economy 
highlighted some variables, which contain useful information about future developments in 
inflation.  These are mainly deficit (as a ratio of GDP at market prices), nominal exchange 
rate and international crude oil price inflation. Thus, careful monitoring of the developments 
in these variables may help in forming accurate inflation forecasts and ensures better 
implementation of inflation targeting frame-work. 
The essential preconditions for the adoption of inflation targeting are taking place in Indian 
economy. The monetary policy is becoming independent from fiscal, external, and financial 
concerns. However, the analysis here, suggests that Indian monetary policy is still suffering 
from structural dominance. This suggests that inflation band targeting with a wide target 
range would be a better alternative for India. The existence of supply shocks also suggest that 
there should be more emphasis on transparency and communication under inflation targeting 
regime in India. As suggested by Mishkin (2006), “developing countries, which typically are 
characterized by greater supply shock volatility, should implement an inflation band targeting 
regime with a high degree of accountability and wide target range.”  
This exercise highlights the preconditions for inflation targeting in Indian economy. From 
here, the next interesting research question would be effect of a change in monetary policy 
institution or rules. This question can be tackled within the confines of quantitative general 23 
 
equilibrium models. But we have different competing models, each of which has their own 
frictions and policy implications. Therefore, we can build a VAR model of monetary policy 
for India to provide evidence on stylized facts to include in the theoretical model opted for 
policy analysis and to decide between competing general equilibrium economic models. In 
VAR models, monetary policy actions are identified using theory free restrictions and taking 
into account potential endogenity of policy instruments. . The main inferences of that model 
can be used in to formulate the theoretical model, which in turn can be used to analyze the 
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Seignior age revenue 




as a ratio of 
GDP 
Net RBI 
credit as a 
ratio of GDP 
 
Measure1 Measure2 
1970-71 to 2003-04  1.59  0.91  5.11  5.53  9.99 
1970-71 to 1985-86  1.39  0.87  7.85  4.73  10.06 
1985-86 to 2003-04  1.75  0.92  6.53  6.25  10.37 
1994-95 to 2003-04  1.51  0.77  5.46  5.59  7.20 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on RBI’s handbook of statistics on Indian economy.  
 
Table 2: India’s position on External front 
 
Ratio (as % of GDP)  1990-91 to  
1994-95 
1995-96 to  
1999-00 
2000-01 to  
2003-04 
Imports   8.16  10.39  11.65 
Exports 7.18  8.49  9.94 
Oil imports  2.03  2.22  3.30 
Short term debt  2.28  1.28  0.75 
Short term debt/total debt  6.75  5.24  3.73 
Foreign investment  0.68  1.20  1.74 
Foreign portfolio investment  0.52  0.55  0.78 
Foreign direct investment  0.17  0.66  0.96 
Foreign reserves  4.93  7.46  13.33 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on RBI’s handbook of statistics on Indian economy. 
                                                            
12 Method to calculate the segniorage revenue and inflation tax rate has been given in appendix section A.1. 27 
 
 






Number of Scheduled 
Commercial Banks
14 with Capital 
to Risk Weighted Asset Ratio 
(CRAR) Above 10% 
1996-97 10.29  64 
1997-98 11.5  71 
1998-99 11.24  76 
1999-00 11.39  84 
2000-01 11.43  84 
2001-02 11.82  81 
2002-03 12.42  88 
2003-04 13.15  87 
1996-97 to2003-04  11.66  - 
1996-97 to1999-00  11.11  - 
2000-01 to2003-04  12.21  - 
Source: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy and Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, 2005 
                                                            
13 Above calculated capital adequacy ratio is simple arithmetic average of 26 public sector banks’ ratio 
including 8 banks of State Bank Group (this list excludes Indian Bank). 
14 Scheduled commercial banks include state group banks, nationalized banks, old private sector banks, new 
private sector banks and foreign banks in India and SCBs had to comply with minimum CRAR of 8%by end 





Table 4: Financial Soundness Indicators - 2 

















































1990-91 to 2003-04  -  -  78.93  10.65  -  -  -  0.42  14.4 
1990-91 to 1999-00  -  -  78.55  11.19  -  -  -  -  - 
1991-92 to 2003-04  -  -  -  -  1.57  0.30  8.94  -  - 
1991-92 to 1999-00  -  -  -  -  1.41  0.07  9.20  0.54  15.42 
1996-97 to 2003-04  5.24  2.65  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
1996-97 to 1999-00  6.28  3.23  80.78  9.31  1.50  0.58  9.18  0.60  16.39 
2000-01 to 2003-04  4.20  2.08  79.87  9.29  1.93  0.81  8.34  0.14  11.86 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
                                                            
15 The figure shows the simple arithmetic average over the entire period. 29 
 
Table 5: Analysis in Bivariate Framework
16 and Multivariate Frame-Work
17 
Bivariate Framework 
Period A12 (L) Δmbt=0 A21(L)deft≠0 Outcome 
1970-71 to 2003-04  0.31(0.58)  7.34***(0.01)  Both the identifying restrictions 
are met 
1970-71 to 1985-86  0.30(0.58)  3.05*(0.08)  Both the identifying restrictions 
are met 
1985-86 to 2003-04  2.47(0.12)  1.87(0.17)  One of the identifying restriction 
fails to meet 
Multivariate Frame-Work 
1970-71 to 2003-04  ∑λj
18
  λ1= λ2 =0  Lags 
Three-Variable System  2.75**(0.01)  7.59***(0.0059)  1 
Four-Variable System   2.14**(0.04)  4.59**(0.0322)  1 
1985-86 to 2003-04  ∑λj  λ1= λ2 =0  Lags 
Three-Variable System   1.37(0.20)  1.88(0.17)  1 




Table 6: GFVDs for Quarterly Sample: 1996Q1 TO 2004 Q1 
Horizon  Shock to M0 growth 
Explaining Forecast Error of 
Inflation 
Shock to deficit explaining Forecast 
Error Of Inflation 
Q1 3.5248  4.7507 
Q2 6.5031  35.3639 
Q4 5.5175  39.4728 
 
                                                            
16 For all the three periods two-variable VAR has been estimated and lags are selected on the basis of AIC 
criterion turns out to be 1.  
17 The stationarity tests of the variables included in the system are given in appendix and lags has been selected 
on the basis of Akaike Information criterion. Maximum lag length has been set to two to maintain sufficient 
degrees of freedom. 
18 The relevant P-value is shown in the bracket. 30 
 
Table 7: GFVDs from a VAR with Exchange Rate and Crude Oil Price Inflation 
Horizon  VAR with Exchange Rate  VAR with International Crude 
Oil Price Inflation 
Shocks to exchange 
rate explaining 
Forecast Error for 
inflation  
 
Shocks to exchange 
rate explaining 
Forecast Error for 
interest rate 











interest rate  
1 1.332  0.745  6.375  0.884 
3 4.619  4.117  6.021  1.413 
6 10.980  3.696  9.696  4.399 
12 12.187  4.887  12.515  4.176 
18 15.016  4.731  20.439  5.298 
 
Table 8: GFVDs from a VAR with Supply Shocks  
Horizon  Under HSC Identification  Under VSC Identification 
Supply shocks 
explaining 













1 6.537  38.278  0.016  14.149 
3 18.114  39.134  2.381  18.418 
6 18.367  38.325  10.606  17.759 




Table 9: Model Selection for Financial Sector Dominance 
  Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3  Specification 4 










BSEres  BSEres  BSEres  BSEres 
Independent 
Variable 
M0res  M0res  CMRres  CMRres 
Lags↓ Coefficients→ 
1 0.106  -0.032  -0.022  -0.022 
2 0.366  -0.350  -0.002  -0.305*** 
3  0.020 0.210 0.020 0.202** 
4 0.619**  -0.150  0.014  0.043 
5 0.131    0.002   
6 -0.511*   -0.007   
Wald test F- 
Statistics  











Notes: *,  **,  *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Table 10: GFVDs from a VAR of Financial Sector (1990:M4 to 1999:M12) 
  Period: 1990:M4 to 1999:M12  Period: 2000:M1 to 2005:M3 




for BSE Sensex 
Shock to CMR 
Explaining Forecast 
Error for BSE Sensex 










Error  for 
BSE Sensex 
1 0.038  0.419  0.016  7.78 
6 0.189  0.692  1.65 17.60 
12 0.205  0.922  1.69  17.81 
18 0.210  0.989  1.69  17.82 
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APPENDIX 
A.1 Fiscal dominance measures:
19 
A.1.1 Seigniorage 
Measure 1: defined as annual change in the reserve money divided by nominal GDP 
Measure 2: defined as annual monetary base multiplied by inflation tax rate and divided by 
nominal GDP 
A.1.2 Inflation tax rate 
Inflation tax rate is defined by the following formula: 
100
Inflation   WPI 100





A.2 Summary of fitted ARIMA models for causality testing 
Lag↓ / Variable→ BSE  Sensex  M0 CMR 
1990:M4 to 1999:M12 
Fitted ARIMA 
Model 
(3,1,0) (4,1,0) (1,0,2) 
AR(1) 0.326***  -0.244***  0.915*** 
AR(2) 0.029  -0.187*   
AR(3) -0.237**  0.029   
AR(4)   -0.204**   
MA(1)     0.349*** 




(1,1,0) (1,1,4) (0,1,1) 
AR(1) 0.256**  -0.625**   
MA(1)   -0.454*  0.657*** 
MA(2)   0.230   
MA(3)   -0.619***   
MA(4)   0.605***   
Notes: (1.) The figures in parenthesis below the variables denote (p, d, q) i.e. ar terms, order of differencing and 
ma terms respectively, (2.) *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively, (3.) BSE 
Sensex and M0 are converted to their natural logarithm.  
 
                                                            
19 These formulae are taken from “The scope for inflation targeting in Developing Countries”, Masson et al. 
(1997) 